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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sameric Corporation of Delaware ("Sameric") appeals 
from the district court's order of July 14, 1997, granting 
summary judgment to the City of Philadelphia (the "City") 
and various individual defendants. Sameric filed this action 
in November 1995 alleging that the City violated its federal 
and state constitutional rights by improperly designating 
Sameric's theater as an historic building and subsequently 
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denying Sameric a permit to demolish the theater. 
Sameric's complaint alleged that, as a result of the 
defendants' unlawful designation of the theater and 
subsequent denial of the demolition permit, its business 
was injured and it was forced to sell its properties, 
including the theater, at substantially less than fair market 
value. 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1367. We have 
jurisdiction to review the final order of the district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Philadelphia's Historic Preservation Ordinance 
 
The Philadelphia Historical Commission ("Historical 
Commission") is an instrumentality of the City which 
administers Philadelphia's Historic Preservation Ordinance 
(the "ordinance"). The Historical Commission's primary 
obligation is to "[d]esignate as historic those buildings, 
structures, sites and objects which the Commission 
determines, pursuant to the criteria set forth in Subsection 
(5) of [Section 14-2007], are significant to the City." Phila. 
Code S 14-2007(4)(a). The ordinance permits the Historical 
Commission to designate a building1 as historic where at 
least one of ten enumerated criteria is met. 
 
When a building is proposed for historic designation, the 
Historical Commission prepares a nomination form, which 
begins the process by which the Historical Commission 
considers buildings for designation. The nomination form 
details information regarding the building's historic, 
architectural, and cultural features. The Designation 
Committee of the Historical Commission (the "Designation 
Committee") is responsible for selecting which nominated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We use the term "building" throughout this opinion because this case 
involves a building. However, our discussion of the designation of a 
building under the ordinance also encompasses the designation of 
structures, objects, complexes of buildings, and districts which, for the 
most part, are treated equally under the ordinance. 
 
                                3 
  
buildings the Historical Commission will consider for 
historic designation. When the Designation Committee 
recommends a building for preservation, it presents its 
report and recommendation to the Historical Commission 
at a hearing on the matter. 
 
Pursuant to the ordinance, the owner of a building 
designated as historic may not demolish or alter that 
building without a permit from the Department of Licenses 
and Inspections ("Department of Licenses"). See Phila. Code 
S 14-2007(7)(a). If an owner desires such a permit, it 
applies to the Department of Licenses, which then forwards 
the application to the Historical Commission for review. An 
owner may obtain the permit where it is suffering "financial 
hardship" or the building "cannot be used for any purpose 
for which it is or may be reasonably adapted." Phila. Code 
S 14-2007(7)(f). The ordinance requires the Department of 
Licenses to grant the application if the Historical 
Commission has no objection but to deny the application if 
the Historical Commission does object. See Phila. Code 
S 14-2007(7)(g). Upon the denial of such a permit, the 
owner may appeal to the Board of License and Inspection 
Review (the "Board of License Review"). See Phila. Code 
S 14-2007(10). 
 
B. Historic Designation of the Boyd Theater 
 
Prior to 1988, Sameric owned the Boyd Theater2 on 
Chestnut Street in Philadelphia. The Historical Commission 
began to consider the Boyd Theater as a candidate for 
designation as historic in 1984 or 1985 by reason of 
discussions between members of the Historical Commission 
and the City of Philadelphia Planning Commission. 
 
As a result, a staff employee of the Historical Commission 
prepared a nomination form for the Boyd Theater in 
January 1986. The nomination form detailed the Boyd 
Theater's notable features and included photographs and 
citations to publications concerning the theater. The 
completed nomination form was forwarded to the 
Designation Committee, which held a meeting to consider 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The theater was also known as the Sameric Theater. 
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the nomination. The Designation Committee decided 
unanimously to recommend to the Historical Commission 
that the Boyd Theater be designated as historic. 
 
Following this vote, the Historical Commission sent 
Sameric a letter on March 28, 1986, indicating the 
Commission's intent to consider designating the theater. 
The letter notified Sameric that a hearing was scheduled for 
April 30, 1986, to consider the matter. At Sameric's 
request, the Commission postponed this hearing six times. 
 
On January 27, 1987, Sameric attempted to prevent the 
Historical Commission from considering the proposed 
designation by filing an action in equity in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County seeking a temporary 
restraining order against the Historical Commission. The 
Court of Common Pleas stayed the Historical Commission's 
consideration of the proposed designation for 30 days. On 
January 30, 1987, the Historical Commission removed the 
suit to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania on the grounds that some of the 
claims arose under the Constitution. The district court then 
granted the Commission's motion to dismiss Sameric's  
complaint.3 See Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St., Inc. v. 
Philadelphia Historical Comm'n, Civ. A. No. 87-553, 1987 
WL 7636, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1987). 
 
Following the district court's dismissal of the complaint, 
the Historical Commission held a hearing on March 25, 
1987, to consider the proposed designation of the Boyd 
Theater as historic. At the hearing, Commissioner David 
Brownlee, a member of the Designation Committee, 
presented the committee's recommendation and report. 
Although, during the hearing, Sameric's counsel repeatedly 
asked the Historical Commission to postpone the vote so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The district court held that Sameric was not entitled to a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the Historical Commission from considering the 
designation of the theater because Sameric was not subject to an 
immediate threat. According to the court, the convening of a hearing did 
not in itself pose a threat to Sameric. Further, the court found that the 
potential designation would not harm Sameric, as only the subsequent 
denial of a permit required by virtue of the designation would pose a 
threat to Sameric. 
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that Sameric could present evidence, the Historical 
Committee voted to designate the Boyd Theater as historic, 
with only Commissioner John Street dissenting. 
 
Later that day, Sameric requested the Court of Common 
Pleas to vacate the Historical Commission's decision and 
reschedule the hearing because the Commission did not 
properly notify Sameric of the hearing and because Sameric 
was not prepared to present certain evidence at the 
hearing. The court granted Sameric's request and ordered 
the Historical Commission to reconvene to hear the matter 
again. See Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St. v. City of 
Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 4525 (Ct. C.P. Phila. County Mar. 
25, 1987). 
 
The Commission held the second hearing on April 2, 
1987. At this hearing, Commissioner Brownlee again 
presented the Designation Committee's recommendation for 
designation and described the theater as a superb example 
of art deco. The Commissioner then presented a slide show 
detailing particular features of the theater, both interior 
and exterior. The Designation Committee's report 
emphasized that the building was an authentic example of 
art deco and that the building was "almost completely 
intact both on the interior and exterior." App. 54-55. 
 
The president of Sameric, Merton Shapiro, then testified 
that many of the features which the Designation Committee 
emphasized, such as the ticket booth, entrancewayfloor, 
glass doors to the main lobby, mirrors, and the lobby 
ceiling, were not original. Shapiro presented slides of the 
building which illustrated the original appearance of the 
theater, both exterior and interior, and narrated the 
presentation, pointing out all the changes that he and 
others had made to the appearance of the theater. App. 
163-69. Upon the completion of Shapiro's presentation, 
Richard Tyler, the Executive Director of the Historical 
Commission, acknowledged that Shapiro's presentation 
showed that there had been substantial changes to the 
appearance of the theater. Tyler also urged the Commission 
members to consider this evidence. App. 192. 
 
The Historical Commission also heard testimony on 
behalf of Sameric from a partner of an architecturalfirm 
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regarding the authenticity of the Boyd Theater's art deco 
style. App. 183-87. According to the architect, the theater 
was not an architecturally notable building in either its 
original or present form. App. 184. In addition, the 
architect testified that of the 18 criteria enumerated in a 
scholarly treatise which identify the art deco style, the 
remaining portion of the Boyd Theater's original facade 
included only five. App. 184. 
 
At the close of the evidence, the Historical Commission 
again voted to designate the Boyd Theater as historic, with 
only Commissioner Street again voting against the 
designation. 
 
C. The State Court Proceedings 
 
Following the designation of the Boyd Theater as historic, 
on April 24, 1987, Sameric filed a complaint in equity in 
the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia County against 
the City challenging the designation of the theater. The 
parties agreed that Sameric's suit should be construed as 
an appeal from the decision of a local agency pursuant to 
2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 752 (West 1995). See Sameric Corp. 
of Chestnut St., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 558 A.2d 155, 
156 n.1. (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1989). The Court of Common 
Pleas dismissed the action, and the Commonwealth Court 
affirmed, holding that the evidence regarding the exterior 
was sufficient to support the designation and that the 
designation of the interior was within the authority of the 
ordinance. See id. at 156-57. 
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania originally 
held that the historic designation of the Boyd Theater 
amounted to a taking without just compensation in 
violation of Article I, Section 10, of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. See United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City 
of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991).4 Thus, the court did 
not decide whether the designation was proper under the 
ordinance. One justice filed a concurring opinion stating 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because Sameric sold its assets to United Artists in April 1988, the 
appellant was changed from Sameric to United Artists while the case was 
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 
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that the designation was improper under the ordinance 
because it was based on the interior of the building; thus, 
he found it unnecessary and imprudent to reach the state 
constitutional issue. See id. at 28 (Cappy, J., concurring). 
 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania later granted 
rehearing and reconsidered the appeal. On rehearing, the 
court held that designating a privately owned building as 
historic did not automatically constitute an 
unconstitutional taking. See United Artists' Theater Circuit, 
Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 620 (Pa. 1993) 
(hereinafter "United Artists' II"). However, the court also 
found that the ordinance does not permit designation based 
upon a building's interior, and therefore, the Historical 
Commission improperly designated the Boyd Theater to the 
extent the designation was based upon its interior. See id. 
at 622. Because the court found it impossible to separate 
the evidence so as to decide whether there was sufficient 
evidence based only on the exterior of the theater to 
support its designation, the court vacated the Historical 
Commission's designation of the Boyd Theater. See id. 
 
Insofar as we are aware, the Commission has not 
redesignated the building as historic. While the court in 
United Artists' II did not in its opinion remand the case to 
the Common Pleas Court, according to Sameric it is seeking 
damages in the Common Pleas Court attributable to the 
designation of the Boyd Theater as historic. 
 
D. Sameric's Application for a Demolition Permit 
 
On April 8, 1987, six days after the Historical 
Commission designated the Boyd Theater as historic, 
Sameric filed an application for a demolition permit for the 
theater, which was transferred immediately to the Historical 
Commission for review. On April 9, 1987, the Architectural 
Review Committee of the Historical Commission held a brief 
hearing on Sameric's application. The Historical 
Commission then postponed consideration of the 
application until August 26, 1987. At a series of meetings, 
the Historical Commission considered evidence and, on 
December 2, 1987, it voted to deny Sameric's application 
for a demolition permit. On February 2, 1988, the Historical 
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Commission issued its Findings of Fact and Decision. 
Pursuant to the ordinance, the Department of Licenses 
denied the permit based upon the Historical Commission's 
objection to it. See Phila. Code S 14-2007(7)(g). 
 
On December 15, 1987, Sameric appealed the denial of 
its application for a demolition permit to the Board of 
License Review. In April 1988, Sameric sold all of its 
theaters, including the Boyd, to United Artists Theater 
Circuit, Inc. Under the terms of the sale, Sameric retained 
its claims for damages resulting from the historic 
designation of the theater. After selling the property, 
Sameric abandoned its appeal of the denial of the permit. 
Thus, the Board of License Review never concluded its 
hearings or rendered a decision on Sameric's appeal. 
 
E. The District Court Proceedings 
 
In November 1995, Sameric instituted this suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania against the City, the Historical Commission, 
and various individual defendants who were the Executive 
Director and Commissioners of the Historical Commission, 
in their individual and official capacities. Consequently, in 
the course of this opinion, depending upon our context, our 
references to the City may include all of the defendants. 
Sameric's complaint asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 for violations of its federal substantive and 
procedural due process rights as well as a civil conspiracy 
claim against all defendants. In addition, Sameric alleged 
that the defendants violated various rights secured under 
the Pennsylvania Constitution. 
 
As a result of these alleged violations, Sameric asserts 
that its business was injured and that its property was 
reduced in value. In particular, Sameric alleges that 
beginning in late 1986, after the commencement of the 
designation proceedings, it was unable to obtainfinancing 
because the proposed designation of the theater would 
reduce the value of the property significantly. Thus, 
beginning in 1987, Sameric no longer could afford to obtain 
quality films for its theaters. Sameric contends that 
ultimately it was forced to sell its entire holdings because 
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of its financial difficulties, and because of the historic 
designation it received substantially less than fair market 
value for the theater. 
 
The district court dismissed Sameric's procedural due 
process claim in February 1996, but Sameric does not 
appeal from this dismissal.5 At the close of discovery, on 
July 14, 1997, the district court granted the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on the remainder of 
Sameric's claims. First, in an order from which Sameric 
does not appeal, the district court dismissed all claims 
against the Historical Commission because Sameric 
conceded that it was not a proper defendant. See Sameric 
Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 95- 
7057, 1997 WL 399374, at *3 n.5 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1997). 
Second, the district court found that, as a matter of law, 
the City was within its authority to designate the Boyd 
based on its future cultural value if converted to live 
performance space. The district court's subsequent 
holdings were based upon this finding. In particular, the 
district court held that (1) Sameric did not raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the defendants acted 
arbitrarily or with an improper motive in designating the 
Boyd Theater as historic; (2) the claims based upon the 
City's subsequent denial of Sameric's application for a 
demolition permit were not ripe; and (3) the individual 
defendants were entitled to immunity with respect to both 
the federal claims and those arising under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. Sameric filed a timely notice of appeal from 
this order. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The district court dismissed Sameric's procedural due process claims 
for failure to state a claim. See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of 
Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 95-7957, 1996 WL 47973, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 
2, 1996). The district court held that Pennsylvania provided a judicial 
mechanism permitting Sameric to challenge the designation of the Boyd 
Theater. See id. In particular, the district court noted that the parties 
agreed that the state court action should be treated as an appeal of the 
designation. See id. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Substantive Due Process 
 
Sameric's complaint asserts a 42 U.S.C. S 1983 claim 
that the Historical Commission's designation of the Boyd 
Theater as historic and its subsequent denial of the 
demolition permit violated Sameric's substantive due 
process rights. According to Sameric, the defendants, in 
taking these actions, were motivated by the ultra vires 
purpose of obtaining a venue for live performances and, 
notwithstanding this purpose, they acted without factual 
support thus rendering their actions arbitrary and 
irrational. The district court granted defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, holding that it was proper under the 
ordinance to designate the theater based upon its potential 
as a performance space and that Sameric therefore failed to 
establish that there was a genuine issue of material fact 
that the defendants acted either with an improper motive or 
without a rational basis.6 
 
We exercise plenary review of the district court's grant of 
summary judgment. See City of Erie v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. 
Co., 109 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1997). We will affirm the 
summary judgment if, after a plenary review of the record, 
we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact for 
trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In the alternative, the district court held that the individual 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from the federal claims 
because they were following their own reasonable interpretation of the 
ordinance. Given our conclusion that Sameric has not established a 
violation of a constitutional right, we need not consider the immunity 
issue. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 
(1991) (stating that in considering whether a defendant is entitled to 
qualified immunity, a court first should consider whether the plaintiff 
has alleged a violation of a constitutional right). 
 
We note, however, that, in the context of land-use decisions, this court 
has recognized the importance of broadly granting immunity to members 
of local boards to allow them to make decisions without the threat of 
being sued by every disgruntled applicant. See Bass v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 
45, 50 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of 
W. Orange, 507 A.2d 1194, 1208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)). 
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matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10 
(1986); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling- 
Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.1993). An issue 
is "genuine" if the evidence permits a reasonable jury to 
return a verdict for the non-moving party, accepting its 
evidence as true and drawing all justifiable inferences from 
the evidence in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 
255, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 2513. 
 
Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but 
provides a remedy against state officials for violations of 
constitutional rights. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 
471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432 (1985) (plurality 
opinion); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3, 99 
S.Ct. 2689, 2694-95 n.3 (1979). The initial inquiry in a 
section 1983 suit is (1) whether the conduct complained of 
was committed by a person acting under color of state law7 
and (2) whether the conduct deprived the complainant of 
rights secured under the Constitution or federal law. See 
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55 
(1988); Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 
To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff 
must prove that it was deprived of a protected property 
interest by arbitrary or capricious government action. See 
Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 1290 
(3d Cir. 1993). Because the defendants conceded in the 
district court that Sameric had a property interest sufficient 
to invoke the protections of substantive due process, the 
only issue on this point is whether the City 
unconstitutionally deprived Sameric of that interest. A 
substantive due process violation is established if "the 
government's actions were not rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest" or " `were in fact motivated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. There is no dispute that the defendants herein are "persons" acting 
under color of state law. The City is subject to section 1983 liability 
for 
injuries caused by its official policies and customs, see Monell v. 
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38 
(1978), and actions by the Historical Commission, one of its agencies, 
constitute such official policies, see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 
U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298 (1986). 
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by bias, bad faith or improper motive.' " Parkway Garage, 
Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 
F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also Independent Enters., 
Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 
1179 (3d Cir. 1997) (government's deliberate and arbitrary 
abuse of authority violates substantive due process); Bello 
v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (3d Cir. 1988) (same). 
The former inquiry is a question of law for the court 
whereas, if there is a genuine dispute of fact, the latter is 
a question for resolution by the jury. See Parkway Garage, 
5 F.3d at 692. 
 
1. Designation of the Boyd Theater 
 
a. Improper Motive 
 
Sameric alleges that the City designated the Boyd Theater 
based on its desire to procure live performance space, a 
consideration not within its authority under the ordinance, 
which thus was an improper motive. However, because the 
district court construed the ordinance to permit historic 
designation based on that consideration, the district court 
found that Sameric failed to establish a genuine issue as to 
whether the City acted with an improper motive. Sameric 
contends that the district court erred in its interpretation of 
the ordinance and therefore concludes that the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment because it 
based its determination upon an erroneous interpretation of 
the ordinance. Although we agree that the district court 
erred in its interpretation of the ordinance and its analysis 
of the allegedly improper purpose thereby is flawed, we will 
affirm the grant of summary judgment for the following 
reasons. 
 
Our disposition of this issue involves three inquiries: (1) 
whether the consideration of the potential uses and future 
cultural value of a building is improper under the 
ordinance; and, if so, (2) whether Sameric presented 
evidence which creates an issue of fact as to whether the 
Commission was motivated by such considerations; and (3) 
whether the Commission acted with an "improper purpose" 
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under substantive due process principles in considering 
criteria unauthorized under state law. We will discuss these 
inquiries in turn. 
 
Under the ordinance, a building may be designated as 
historic if it: 
 
       (a) Has significant character, interest or value as part 
       of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics 
       of the City, Commonwealth or Nation or is associated 
       with the life a person significant in the past; or 
 
       (b) Is associated with an event of importance to the 
       history of the City, Commonwealth or Nation; or, 
 
       (c) Reflects the environment in an era characterized by 
       a distinctive architectural style; or, 
 
       (d) Embodies distinguishing characteristics of an 
       architectural style or engineering specimen; or, 
 
       (e) Is the work of a designer, architect, landscape 
       architect or designer, or engineer whose work has 
       significantly influenced the historical, architectural, 
       economic, social, or cultural development of the City, 
       Commonwealth or Nation; or, 
 
       (f) Contains elements of design, detail, materials or 
       craftsmanship which represent a significant 
       innovation; or, 
 
       (g) Is part of or related to a square, park or other 
       distinctive area which should be preserved according to 
       an historic, cultural or architectural motif; or, 
 
       (h) Owing to its unique location or singular physical 
       characteristic, represents an established and familiar 
       visual feature of the neighborhood, community or City; 
       or, 
 
       (i) Has yielded, or may be likely to yield, information 
       important in pre-history or history; or, 
 
       (j) Exemplifies the cultural, political, economic, social 
       or historical heritage of the community. 
 
Phila. Code S 14-2007(5). In addition, the ordinance 
announces the following purposes: 
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       (.1) preserve buildings, structures, sites and objects 
       which are important to the education, culture, 
       traditions and economic values of the City; . . . 
 
       (.5) strengthen the economy of the City by enhancing 
       the City's attractiveness to tourists and by stabilizing 
       and improving property values; 
 
Phila. Code S 14-2007(1)(b). 
 
Relying on the first enumerated criterion and thefirst 
and fifth stated purposes, the district court found that the 
ordinance is "broad enough to protect the possible cultural 
and economic gains which could accrue from preserving a 
theater of this size." Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 1997 WL 399374, at *4. Thus, the court found 
that to the extent the Commission based its decision upon 
economic and cultural interests, it acted permissibly under 
the ordinance and noted that the ordinance was "not so 
narrow that it precludes historic designation based on 
either the size of the theater or its suitability as a 
performance venue." Id. 
 
We agree with the district court to the extent that it 
found that the ordinance permits consideration of cultural 
and economic factors. The plain language of the ordinance 
clearly refers to such considerations, see Phila. Code S 14- 
2007(1)(b)(.1) & (.5), and the ordinance declares a broad 
public policy to preserve the "historic, architectural, 
cultural, [and] aesthetic" merit of buildings. See Phila. Code 
S 14-2007(1)(a). In addition, the ordinance requires that the 
Historical Commission be composed of individuals with 
diverse expertise, emphasizing the concern for the culture, 
economy, and development of the City.8  See Phila. Code 
S 14-2007(3). We, however, cannot agree that the ordinance 
permits designation based upon the potential value of the 
theater if converted to a live performance venue. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The ordinance requires that the Historical Commission be composed, 
inter alia, of the Director of Commerce, the Chairman of the City 
Planning Commission, a real estate developer, a representative from a 
community development corporation, and a representative from a 
community organization. 
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Under Pennsylvania law, " `the power and authority to be 
exercised by administrative commissions must be conferred 
by legislative language clear and unmistakable. A doubtful 
power does not exist.' " United Artists'  II, 635 A.2d at 622 
(quoting Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. St. Joe 
Minerals Corp., 382 A.2d 731, 735-36 (Pa.1978)). Because 
we find that the plain language of the ordinance does not 
confer clear and unmistakable authority to designate a 
building based upon its potential, future cultural value, we 
hold that the Historical Commission does not possess such 
authority. 
 
The enumerated purpose of the statute which relates 
most directly to the culture of the City, see Phila. Code 
S 14-2007(1)(b)(.1), speaks in terms of the present 
importance of the building to the City's culture. More 
importantly, the criteria enumerated in the ordinance 
conspicuously and consistently refer to the value of a 
building in the present tense. In particular, thefirst 
enumerated criterion for historic designation, upon which 
the City primarily relies, allows designation where the 
building "has significant . . . value as part of the 
development . . . of the City." Phila. Code S 14-2007(5)(a). 
The City argues that this criterion encompasses a 
designation where, as here, the Historical Commission finds 
that a building, if converted to a use for which it is 
suitable, would further a plan for the development of the 
City. 
 
We disagree. While the "development" of the City 
necessarily refers to the future of the community, the 
ordinance only refers to the present value of a building, 
which is on its face limited to a consideration of the present 
condition of a building. The ordinance clearly permits the 
Historical Commission to consider the future in only one 
instance, which is not applicable here -- the possibility that 
a building will yield important information. See Phila. Code 
S 14-2007(5)(i). Thus, the ordinance does not clearly permit 
the Historical Commission to consider potential uses of a 
building in evaluating its value. 
 
In addition, our interpretation follows the lead of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of this 
ordinance. To our knowledge, the state court proceedings in 
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this dispute, culminating in a decision by that court, have 
generated the only published judicial interpretation of this 
ordinance. It is axiomatic that the highest court of a state 
is the final arbiter of that state's law. See West v. American 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236, 61 S.Ct. 179, 183 
(1940). Thus, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has not addressed the precise issue which we now 
consider, we give great weight to its interpretation of this 
ordinance in United Artists' II. We find that the district 
court's interpretation is inconsistent with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the ordinance, namely 
that the Historical Commission has no authority to 
designate a building on the basis of its interior. 
 
In United Artists' II, the court held that "[t]he Historical 
Commission is not explicitly authorized by statute to 
designate the interior of the building as historically or 
aesthetically significant." United Artists' II, 635 A.2d at 622. 
The court began its analysis by noting the "clear and 
unmistakable" language standard in Pennsylvania 
administrative law. See id. The court then turned to the 
language of the ordinance and found that the only reference 
to the interior of the building in Phila. Code S 14-2007 is in 
the subsection which imposes upon the owner of a historic 
building the duty of care. See id. Because the language in 
that section concerns the interior only for the express 
purpose of supporting the exterior, the court found that it 
was beyond the Historical Commission's authority to 
designate a building based upon its interior.9 See id. 
 
We find that, if the ordinance does not permit historic 
designation based upon an historic or aesthetic feature of 
the interior of a building, it necessarily does not permit 
designation based upon the cultural value or potential uses 
of the interior. This conclusion, in addition to our own 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Section 14-2007(8)(c) provides that 
 
       [t]he exterior of every historic building, structure and object and 
of 
       every building, structure and object located within an historic 
       district shall be kept in good repair as shall the interior 
portions of 
       such buildings, structures and objects, neglect of which may cause 
       or tend to cause the exterior to deteriorate, decay, become damaged 
       or otherwise fall into a state of disrepair. 
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interpretation of the plain language of the ordinance, leads 
us to the determination that the district court erred in its 
interpretation of the ordinance. This determination, 
however, does not end our inquiry. We also must consider 
whether Sameric established a genuine issue as to whether 
the Historical Commission was motivated by such a 
consideration, and, if such an issue exists, whether, as a 
matter of law, that motivation would constitute an 
"improper motive" under substantive due process 
jurisprudence. 
 
Citing primarily the testimony of one of the 
Commissioners, Barbara Kaplan, Sameric contends that it 
has produced evidence which creates a genuine issue of 
fact regarding the motivation of the Historical Commission 
in voting to designate the Boyd Theater. In her comments 
at the designation hearing and her deposition testimony, 
Commissioner Kaplan expressed her interest in the theater 
as cultural space, admitted that she considered potential 
uses of the theater, and stated that she was aware of the 
community's need for live performance space. 
 
We have held that evidence regarding the intentions of 
single member of a zoning board can create a genuine issue 
of fact as to the board's motive. See DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. 
of Adjustment for the Twp. of W. Amwell, 53 F.3d 592, 602 
(3d Cir. 1995) (evidence that one member of the zoning 
board acted for personal reasons was sufficient to create a 
genuine issue as to whether the board's decision was 
influenced by that member's personal interest, and thus 
acted with an improper motive). Thus, given the evidence of 
Commissioner Kaplan's motivation, we assume without 
deciding that this evidence creates a genuine issue of fact 
regarding whether the Historical Commission was 
motivated by the Boyd Theater's potential use and cultural 
value as performance space. 
 
However, only issues of material fact preclude entry of 
summary judgment. As the Supreme Court has stated, 
"[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of 
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the 
entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are 
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Because this motive is 
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not improper under substantive due process law, this issue 
of fact is not material, and summary judgment was proper. 
 
On this issue, at the outset we note that Sameric has not 
established, or for that matter even alleged, that the 
Historical Commission's decision to designate the building 
was motivated by personal gain, individuous discriminatory 
intent, or partisan political considerations, the presence of 
which we have found establish substantive due process 
claims based upon improper motive. See, e.g., DeBlasio, 53 
F.3d at 601 (personal financial interest); Parkway Garage, 
5 F.3d at 697 n.6 (economic motivation); Bello, 840 F.2d at 
1129 (partisan political or personal reasons); see also Grant 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(alleging that the defendants were motivated by partisan 
politics in designating an area as historic as they intended 
to thwart plaintiffs' development project so that the mayor 
would not receive credit for the resulting economic 
benefits). 
 
Rather, Sameric proffers that the City's improper motive 
was its ultra vires reliance on procuring live performance 
space for the community. As discussed above, we find that 
the City did exceed its authority to the extent that it based 
its decision upon such a motivation. This error, however, is 
only one of law, and such an error is not sufficient in itself 
to establish a substantive due process claim. See Snowden 
v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11, 64 S.Ct. 397, 402 (1944); 
Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 684 (stating that federal 
courts are not in the business of granting federal"remedies 
for mere violations of state law"); Archie v. City of Racine, 
847 F.2d 1211, 1216-18 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding 
that a violation of state law does not amount to a violation 
of due process). 
 
We recognize that, to prove a substantive due process 
claim, a plaintiff need not establish in every case that the 
defendants sought to advance personal interests. See 
Parkway Garage, 5 F.3d at 697 n.6. We find, however, that 
Parkway Garage does not lend Sameric support beyond 
that point. In Parkway Garage, the plaintiff alleged that the 
City violated its substantive due process rights by 
prematurely and unjustifiably terminating its lease and 
closing the garage that the plaintiff managed on the 
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property. See id. at 689-91. While the City contended that 
its actions were in furtherance of the public safety to avoid 
the imminent collapse of the plaintiff's parking garage, the 
plaintiff presented evidence that this alleged motivation was 
a pretext. See id. at 693-94. Rather, according to the 
plaintiff, the City was motivated economically because the 
property was more valuable to the City without the 
encumbrance of the plaintiff's lease. Thus, we held that if 
the plaintiff proved that the defendants where driven by the 
economic benefit to the City, such a motivation would 
establish an improper motive sufficient to sustain a 
substantive due process claim. See id. at 699. 
 
There is no allegation here that the City sought to 
advance its direct economic position in designating the 
theater. Thus, this case differs fundamentally from 
Parkway Garage in which the City owned property involved 
in the case. Taken in the light most favorable to Sameric, 
the evidence supports an inference that the Historical 
Commission considered the potential uses of the Boyd 
Theater, which the Commission believed could fill a void in 
the community. There is not sufficient evidence, however, 
that the City was in a position to realize the type of direct 
economic gain alleged in Parkway Garage. Thus, we find 
that Sameric has not produced evidence of an "improper 
motive."10 
 
b. Arbitrary and Irrational Government Action 
 
As an independent basis for its substantive due process 
claim, Sameric also alleges that the City acted arbitrarily 
and irrationally in designating the Boyd Theater. Relying 
again on its interpretation of the ordinance, the district 
court concluded that because a designation as historic may 
be based upon its "significant interest or value to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Our conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate in this case 
is not at odds with the notion that the determination of whether 
defendants were motivated by bias, personal interest, or other improper 
motive is, if there is a genuine dispute of fact, a question of fact for 
the 
jury. See Parkway Garage, 5 F.3d at 692, 697 n.6. Here, we conclude 
that the particular motive which Sameric alleged is not improper as a 
matter of law. 
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development of the City," Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City 
of Philadelphia, 1997 WL 399374, at *5, Sameric did not 
present evidence which creates a genuine issue of fact that 
the defendants lacked a rational basis for designating the 
Boyd Theater as historic. Sameric contends that because 
the district court based its holding on a misinterpretation of 
state law, we should reverse the grant of summary 
judgment. Again, although we agree that the district court 
erred in its interpretation of the ordinance, we find that 
Sameric has not produced sufficient evidence from which a 
jury could find arbitrary and irrational government 
conduct. 
 
We have held that, in the context of a land-use decision, 
"the deliberate and arbitrary abuse of government power 
violates an individual's right to substantive due process." 
Bello, 840 F.2d at 1129 (declining to define the "outer limits 
of the showing necessary to demonstrate" arbitrary and 
irrational governmental action because the plaintiff 
adduced evidence that the decision was based upon 
"partisan political or personal reasons unrelated to the 
merits of the application for the permits"); see also 
DeBlasio, 53 F.3d at 601. Government conduct is arbitrary 
and irrational where it is not rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose. See Parkway Garage, 5 
F.3d at 692; Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 692; Pace 
Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1035 
(3d Cir. 1987). 
 
Our review of a locality's land-use decision asks whether 
the locality "could have had a legitimate reason for its 
decision." Pace, 808 F.2d at 1034, 1035 (citing Shelton v. 
City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(en banc) (holding that "federal judicial interference with a 
state zoning board's quasi-legislative decisions, like 
invalidation of legislation for `irrationality' or `arbitrariness,' 
is proper only if the governmental body could have no 
legitimate reason for its decision")). Thus, in Pace, we found 
that summary judgment for the defendant was appropriate 
because the township "could have had rational reasons for" 
its land-use decision relating to the property owner's 
development plan "and because th[e] complaint allege[d] no 
facts suggesting arbitrariness." Id. at 1036. In holding that 
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the plaintiff in Pace did not allege sufficiently a substantive 
due process violation, we also noted that it did"not present 
a case involving actions aimed at this developer for reasons 
unrelated to land use planning." Id. at 1035. 
 
In Pace, we cited with approval Creative Environments, 
Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1982), which we 
again find persuasive. In Creative Environments, the 
plaintiff alleged that the town frustrated the plaintiff's 
development plans by "distorting" state law. See id. at 829. 
The court held that the plaintiff did not establish a 
constitutional violation and noted that "[t]his would be true 
even were planning officials to clearly violate . . . the state 
scheme under which they operate." Id. at 833 (footnote 
omitted). According to the court, the case was an average 
dispute between a property owner and the local zoning 
body and every developer's challenge to a land-use decision 
necessarily involves some claim that the board exceeded or 
abused its legal authority. See id.; see also Anastasio v. 
Planning Bd. of Twp. of W. Orange, 507 A.2d 1194, 1206 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) ("Accordingly while the 
words `arbitrary and capricious' may sound harsh, they are 
simply the standard of appellate review in particular 
cases."). 
 
As in Pace, Sameric has not presented a claim that the 
City acted for reasons "unrelated to land use planning." We 
again note that in undertaking this analysis, we consider 
the action without regard for whether it was sanctioned 
legislatively. See Snowden, 321 U.S. at 11, 64 S.Ct. at 402. 
In Snowden, the plaintiff alleged that the state primary 
election board deprived him of due process and equal 
protection because it refused to certify him as a candidate, 
in violation of state law. See id. at 2-5, 64 S.Ct. at 398-99. 
In Snowden, the Court stated that 
 
       [i]f the action of the Board is official action it is subject 
       to constitutional infirmity to the same but no greater 
       extent than if the action were taken by the state 
       legislature. Its illegality under the state statute can 
       neither add to nor subtract from its constitutional 
       validity. Mere violation of a state statute does not 
       infringe the federal Constitution. And state action, even 
       though illegal under state law, can be no more and no 
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       less constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment 
       than if it were sanctioned by the state legislature.  
 
Id. at 11, 64 S.Ct. at 402 (citations omitted). 
 
Because our substantive due process analysis does not 
depend on the legality vel non of the City's action under 
state law, our inquiry here is essentially the inquiry in 
which we would engage if the City's ordinance had provided 
explicitly for designation based upon the potential use of a 
building and such an ordinance was challenged on 
substantive due process grounds. In short, the proper 
inquiry is whether the City's decision to designate the Boyd 
Theater based upon its potential use and cultural value if 
converted to live performance space is rationally related to 
land-use planning.11 
 
We find that it is rationally related to the legitimate 
government objective of land-use planning for the City to 
designate buildings that have potential use to the 
community. We recognize that an ordinance conferring 
such authority would grant broad power to a local board, 
and in so holding we make no comment on the wisdom of 
such a rule, but decide only that we see no reason why 
conferring such authority would be constitutionally infirm 
under substantive due process law. 
 
As suggested above, Sameric's allegations are very similar 
to those that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
found insufficient in Creative Environments. As did the 
plaintiff in that case, Sameric presents a claim in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The majority of Sameric's brief on this issue is devoted to arguing 
that the City's action in designating the theater was without factual 
basis and therefore amounts to arbitrary and irrational government 
conduct. Thus, Sameric reviews the "extensive" evidence presented 
against designation to the Historical Commission. 
 
We recognize that there is evidence to suggest that the Boyd Theater 
is not as architecturally significant as the Designation Committee 
presented. There is also evidence from which a jury could infer that the 
Historical Commission was predisposed to designate the theater. This 
argument, however, focuses on whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support the designation based upon criteria other than the potential 
cultural value of the Boyd if converted to a live performance space. This 
is not the appropriate inquiry here. 
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nature of an average dispute between a property owner and 
local zoning officials. Thus, as we have in the past, we 
emphasize here our reluctance to substitute our judgment 
for that of local decision-makers, particularly in matters of 
such local concern as land-use planning, absent a local 
decision void of a "plausible rational basis." Pace, 808 F.2d 
at 1035. We decline to federalize routine land-use 
decisions. Rather, the validity of land-use decisions by local 
agencies ordinarily should be decided under state law in 
state courts. After all, surely it would be strange to hold 
that the City had no rational basis for designating the 
theater when the Common Pleas Court, the Commonwealth 
Court, and the district court all thought that its designation 
was valid.12 
 
2. Denial of Demolition Permit 
 
Sameric also alleges that the City violated its substantive 
due process rights in improperly denying its application for 
a demolition permit, although it does not state this claim 
separately from the claim based on the historic designation. 
Nonetheless, we, like the district court, will treat Sameric's 
allegations regarding the denial of the demolition permit as 
if they asserted a separate factual predicate for a 
substantive due process violation. 
 
a. Ripeness 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants on the substantive due process claim based 
upon the City's denial of a demolition permit, finding that 
such a claim was not ripe. In particular, the district court 
held that because Sameric did not complete its appeal of 
the denial, there was never a final denial of the permit 
application. We exercise plenary review over the district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Our conclusion does not necessarily mean that Sameric will not 
receive damages by reason of the historic designation of its property as 
it explains in its brief that it "has intervened[in the Common Pleas 
Court] for the purpose of seeking an assessment of damages as a result 
of the decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania" in United Artists' 
II. Of course, we hasten to add our opinion does not depend on whether 
Sameric makes a recovery in the state court. 
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court's ripeness determination. See Taylor, 983 F.2d at 
1289. 
 
It is well established that, in cases involving land-use 
decisions, a property owner does not have a ripe, 
constitutional claim until the zoning authorities have had 
"an opportunity to `arrive[ ] at afinal, definitive position 
regarding how [they] will apply the regulations at issue to 
the particular land in question.' "13 Id. at 1291 (quoting 
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank 
of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 191, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3119 
(1985)). Thus, we have held that property owners' 
constitutional claims based upon land-use decisions were 
premature where the owners or tenants were denied 
permits by the initial decision-makers but did not avail 
themselves of available, subsequent procedures. See 
Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 974-75 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(owner was denied building permit by Development and 
Licensing Division, but did not appeal the denial to the 
Board of Adjustment or seek a variance); Taylor, 983 F.2d 
at 1289 (owner complained of the zoning officer's revocation 
of tenant's use permit where the tenant did not reapply, 
appeal to the zoning board, or seek a variance); Midnight 
Sessions, 945 F.2d at 686 (holding that the plaintiff's claim 
was not ripe where it did not appeal the denial of a 
certificate of occupancy to the review board). 
 
In Acierno and Taylor, the property owners challenged the 
denial and revocation of permits, respectively. In Acierno, 
the county approved the property owner's building plan, of 
which compliance with zoning ordinances is a prerequisite, 
but denied the owner's application for a building permit, 
citing noncompliance with zoning ordinances. See Acierno, 
6 F.3d at 976. In Taylor, the zoning officer revoked a 
tenant's use permit because the tenant included false 
information in his application for the permit. The owner 
asserted that the basis for the revocation was a pretext and 
that the officer knew of the intended use for the property. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We again note that this finality requirement is not at odds with the 
notion that section 1983 claims are not subject to an exhaustion of 
remedies requirement. See Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1291 n.10 (citing 
Williamson, 473 U.S. at 192-94, 105 S.Ct. at 3119-120). 
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See Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1289-90. Thus, in Acierno and 
Taylor the property owners alleged harm resulting from a 
land-use decision adverse to them. 
 
In both cases, we held that the claims were not ripe 
because the property owners or the tenant did not give the 
locality an opportunity to make a final determination 
regarding how to construe the applicable ordinances and 
apply them to the particular property. The same is true 
here, where Sameric claims that the local land-use decision 
was based on an erroneous application or interpretation of 
the local ordinance. In addition, as in Acierno and Taylor, 
the applicable ordinance explicitly subjects the initial 
decision to review by another body, which owes no 
deference to the initial decision-maker. See Acierno, 6 F.3d 
at 972, 976; Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1292-93. 14 Thus, we find 
that the Department of Licenses' denial was not the City's 
final determination of Sameric's rights to a demolition 
permit under the ordinance. 
 
Sameric urges that Acierno and Taylor are 
distinguishable, and therefore the ripeness requirement 
should not apply to its claim. According to Sameric, the 
property owners in those cases alleged harm resulting from 
the denial of a permit, whereas Sameric alleges harm 
resulting from the designation itself. We acknowledge that 
Sameric alleges harm resulting from the designation itself, 
but it also alleges that the City improperly denied its 
application for a demolition permit. To the extent Sameric's 
substantive due process claim is based upon the latter, 
Acierno and Taylor apply, rendering that portion of 
Sameric's claim not ripe. 
 
Sameric also contends that Blanche Rd. Corp. v. 
Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1995), where we 
refused to apply the finality requirement, applies here. We 
disagree. In Blanche Rd., we further explained the confines 
of these cases requiring a final decision by the local 
authority regarding a land-use decision. There, the plaintiff 
claimed that the local authority abused its power in a 
conspiracy to halt the development of its property because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We do not imply that our result would have been different if the 
administrative standard of review had been deferential. 
 
                                26 
  
of the authority's distaste for its plan. After noting that 
Acierno involved a claim based upon the merits of the land- 
use decision, we found that the property owner's claim in 
Blanche Rd. was substantively different because it was not 
based on the township's adverse decision, but on its 
intentional and improper delay of the process. Inasmuch as 
an improper delay could result in damages notwithstanding 
the ultimate grant of a permit, we declined to apply the 
finality requirement because a review of the permit 
decisions was not necessary to resolve the dispute. See id. 
at 267-68. 
 
In addition, a portion of the owner's claims related to two 
lots to which the owner never exercised its option to 
purchase and for which the owner never sought a building 
permit because it abandoned the development project. We 
held that if the owner's allegations of intentional and 
improper delay were proven, even if the permit ultimately 
were granted, an arbitrary and intentional delay could 
cause damages. See id. at 268. Thus, we found that the 
plaintiff's claims were ripe, even to the extent they were 
based upon damages allegedly suffered with respect to 
these two lots. See id. 
 
We reject Sameric's argument that Blanche Rd. applies 
here. According to Sameric, the finality requirement should 
not apply because, as in Blanche Rd., a favorable decision 
by the Board of License Review would not have prevented 
Sameric from incurring the damages it now seeks to 
recover. Sameric admits, however, that the grant of the 
permit would have reduced its damages. Accordingly, to the 
extent that Sameric's claims are based upon the City's 
denial of a building permit, they are not ripe. Moreover, an 
ordinary lapse of time required for the processing of an 
appeal from the denial of a permit does not permit a 
plaintiff to recast a case as a delay claim; for if it did the 
ripeness requirement effectively would be eliminated. 
 
We again stress the importance of the finality 
requirement and our reluctance to allow the courts to 
become super land-use boards of appeals. Land-use 
decisions concern a variety of interests and persons, and 
local authorities are in a better position than the courts to 
assess the burdens and benefits of those varying interests. 
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See Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1291. Judicial review of the City's 
denial of Sameric's application for a demolition permit 
would be inappropriate because it would permit Sameric to 
have denied the City the opportunity to render a final 
decision regarding how to interpret and apply the 
ordinance. See id. at 1292. 
 
Thus, we find that the district court properly held that 
the claim based upon the denial of the demolition permit 
was not ripe. Ordinarily, because a ripeness determination 
concerns the justiciability of a claim, which the district 
court should resolve on a motion to dismiss rather than on 
a motion for summary judgment, where this courtfinds 
that the district court properly held that the plaintiff's claim 
is not ripe, this court should vacate the grant of summary 
judgment and remand to the district court with instructions 
to dismiss the claim. See Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1290 (citing 
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 
498, 508 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also Acierno, 6 F.3d at 971. 
Here, however, we see no reason to disturb the grant of the 
summary judgment as Sameric's abandonment of its appeal 
from the denial of the demolition permit after it sold the 
property ensures that its claim based on the denial never 
can be ripe. Thus, in this case Sameric's claim with respect 
to the denial of the demolition permit is not simply 
"premature," see Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1287, rather, it never 
will ripen. We thus would require the parties to waste their 
time if we remanded the case for the district court to 
convert the summary judgment into an order of dismissal. 
 
b. Statute of Limitations 
 
Even if this claim were ripe, we would affirm the 
dismissal of Sameric's claim based upon the denial of the 
demolition permit because it is barred by the statute of 
limitations. Although the City apparently raised this 
argument in its motion for summary judgment, the district 
court did not reach this issue in view of its conclusion that 
any claim based upon that denial was not ripe for judicial 
consideration. 
 
In actions under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, federal courts apply 
the state's statute of limitations for personal injury. See 
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Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-78, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 
1947-48 (1985); 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs. v. Township of 
Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320, 323 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, 
because Pennsylvania's statute of limitations for personal 
injury is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5524 
(West Supp. 1997), Sameric's due process claims are 
subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Smith v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
A section 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff 
knew or should have known of the injury upon which its 
action is based. See de Botton v. Marple Twp., 689 F. Supp. 
477, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1988). According to the City, the very 
last date that a cause of action based upon the denial of 
the permit could have accrued was in 1988 when Sameric 
abandoned its appeal to the Board of License Review. 
Because Sameric did not institute this suit until 1995, the 
City concludes that the statute of limitations bars this 
action. 
 
Sameric contends, however, that the "continuing wrong" 
doctrine, which tolls the statute of limitations, renders its 
claim based upon the denial of the demolition permit 
timely. Under this doctrine, a federal cause of action based 
upon the defendant's continuing conduct is timely provided 
that the last act of that continuing conduct is within the 
period for the commencement of an action specified by the 
statute of limitations. See 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 101 
F.3d at 324 (quoting Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 
1991)). In applying the doctrine, this court focuses on the 
affirmative acts of the defendant. See id. 
 
Sameric urges this court to find that its claim was tolled 
by its challenges to the designation of the theater in the 
state court. Sameric bases its argument largely on the 
district court's ruling, from which the City does not appeal, 
regarding the timeliness of its claims. The district court, 
ruling on a motion to dismiss in this case, held that 
Sameric's substantive due process claims based upon the 
designation of the theater were not barred by the statute of 
limitations. See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of 
Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 95-7057, 1996 WL 47973 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 2, 1996). The district court found that the cause of 
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action accrued on April 14, 1987, the date on which the 
Historical Commission officially notified Sameric of the 
designation, but found that the "continuing wrong" doctrine 
tolled the running of the statute of limitations. See id. at *3. 
The district court held that because Sameric was diligent in 
pursuing its claim with respect to the invalidity of the 
designation and the defendants continuously opposed 
Sameric's challenges in state court, the doctrine applied. 
Thus, Sameric's complaint, filed on November 8, 1995, was 
timely because it was filed within two years from the end of 
the state court litigation on November 9, 1993. See id. at 
*4. 
 
We cannot agree that the result is the same here. We 
acknowledge that an historic designation factually underlies 
every cause of action based upon the denial of a demolition 
permit required by the ordinance because a demolition 
permit is only necessary under the ordinance where a 
building has been historically designated. In that sense 
alone a claim based upon a denial of a demolition permit is 
dependent upon the designation. The ordinance establishes 
procedures regarding applications for demolition permits 
separate from those concerning the historic designation of 
a building. Moreover, because the ordinance sets forth 
separate standards for historic designation and for the 
issuance of a demolition permit, the propriety of the City's 
denial of a demolition permit under the ordinance is 
independent from the propriety of the designation itself. 
Thus, a cause of action based upon an improper denial of 
a demolition permit exists regardless of the validity of the 
underlying historic designation. 
 
Although Sameric diligently objected to the designation of 
the theater in state court, it abandoned its appeal of the 
denial of the demolition permit sometime in 1988 after 
selling the theater to United Artists. In addition, Sameric 
instituted its state court proceedings challenging the 
historic designation of the Boyd Theater prior to the 
Historical Commission's denial of its application for a 
demolition permit.15 Thus, because the two claims are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Sameric instituted its state court challenge to the designation on 
April 24, 1987, see app. 845, and the Historical Commission denied its 
permit application on December 2, 1987. 
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independent, application of the "continuing wrong" 
doctrine, as urged by Sameric, would be inappropriate here 
as its diligence did not relate to pursuing the permit. To the 
contrary, it abandoned its attempt to obtain the permit 
many years before it filed this action. Based upon the 
foregoing, we hold that the "continuing wrong" doctrine 
does not apply to toll the running of the statute of 
limitations with respect to Sameric's claim based upon the 
denial of its permit application. 
 
B. Pennsylvania Constitutional Claims 
 
Sameric's complaint also alleges that the defendants' 
conduct deprived it of "the equal protection and[its] rights, 
privileges and immunities" guaranteed under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution. App. 857. The defendants 
asserted a governmental immunity defense to these claims 
under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the"Act"), 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 8541-8564 (West 1982 & Supp. 
1997). According to the district court, the individual 
defendants were immune under the Act because they did 
not consider factors outside of their authority. Again, 
although the district court based its analysis upon an 
erroneous interpretation of the ordinance, we affirm its 
conclusion. 
 
The City is immune from Sameric's claims arising under 
the equal protection and civil rights sections of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution because the Act grants it 
immunity from claims for monetary damages except with 
respect to eight specific types of tortious conduct, none of 
which is applicable here. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 8542(b) (specifying that liability may be imposed upon the 
local agency for damages resulting from the following acts: 
the operation of a motor vehicle; the care or custody of 
personal or real property of others in the possession of the 
agency; dangerous conditions resulting from trees, traffic 
controls or street lighting; dangerous conditions resulting 
from utility service facilities; dangerous condition of streets 
and sidewalks; and the care or custody of animals in the 
possession of the agency); Agresta v. Goode, 797 F. Supp. 
399, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1992). In fact, Sameric conceded during 
the district court proceedings that the Act barred the state 
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constitutional claims asserted against the City. See Sameric 
Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 1997 WL 399374, 
at *7. 
 
We also find that the individual defendants are immune 
under the Act from Sameric's state constitutional claims. 
Under the Act, individual defendants are immune from 
liability for acts within the scope of their employment to the 
same extent as their employing agency, see 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 8545,16 except that they are liable if their 
conduct amounts to actual fraud, crime, actual malice or 
willful misconduct. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8550.17 
"Willful misconduct," as used in section 8550, requires 
evidence that the defendants actually knew that their 
conduct was illegal. See Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 
289, 293-94 (Pa. 1994); see also In re City of Philadelphia 
Litig., 938 F. Supp. 1264, 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Because 
there is insufficient evidence that the individual defendants 
actually knew that their conduct was illegal and no 
evidence at all that crime, fraud, or malice is implicated 
here, the district court properly granted summary judgment 
in favor of the individual defendants based upon immunity 
under the Act. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Section 8545 states that 
 
       [a]n employee of a local agency is liable for civil damages on 
account 
       of any injury to a person or property caused by acts of the 
employee 
       which are within the scope of his office or duties only to the same 
       extent as his employing local agency and subject to the limitations 
       imposed by this subchapter. 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8545. 
 
17. Section 8550 states that the immunity, indemnity, and damage 
limitations of the Act do not apply 
 
       [i]n any action against a local agency or employee thereof for 
       damages on account of an injury caused by the act of the employee 
       in which it is judicially determined that the act of the employee 
       caused the injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual 
       fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct. 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8550. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants. 
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